

it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the facade." This observation, inspired by Roman Italy, may be extended also to medieval Italy. Between republics and despotisms the resemblances seem at least as great as the differences. In political organization both prolonged the past without radical alteration; and not the least striking resemblance between them is their unqualified failure, in common with other forms of European government, to support the fashionable concept of "Renaissance state" or "Renaissance monarchy." Rather do they confirm the view which sees, all over Europe, from the close of the early Middle Ages, a continuous development in the theory, practice and "reason" of the state, itself part of a larger movement, economic as well as political, which transgresses the traditional frontiers of "medieval," "Renaissance" and "modern" history. In Italy at any rate the "Renaissance state" is a fiction to be banished from the books. Here, down to the eighteenth century, government remained, in the words of one observer, "an invincible confusion" . . . and not till the eighteenth century, when despotism became "enlightened," was any attempt made to impose an egalitarian state. In this period, in all states, the same interests prevailed, power and office were effectively restricted to the same privileged order, and from the mass of people, under republics and despots alike, the same complaints monotonously arise: against unjust taxation, against corrupt and costly justice, against local and personal privilege. In the language of Tudor England, government for them was "nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name and title of the Common Wealth." Nor did political writers take a very different view: to Bartolus, to Machiavelli, to Francesco Vettori, all Italian governments were "tyrannies"—of party, of class, of despots. In a more sombre spirit, they shared the opinion later expressed by Dr. Samuel Johnson, when invited to comment on the theme of political liberty: "Sir, that is all visionary. I would not give half a guinea to live under one form of government rather than another."

The Rise of the Medici

DALE KENT

The Florentine constitution, the essential elements of which were established in 1282 and survived until the fall of the republic in 1533, seems designed to prevent the operation of private interest in government at the expense of the common good by the incorporation of two major features—a high degree of citizen participation on one hand, and an almost total lack of general representation on the other. Of course Florentine government was elitist, or oligarchic; in the fifteenth century, for example, participation was restricted to a group of some 2,000 to 3,000 upper-class men who, along with their wives and children, could not have represented more

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than a fifth of the total population of about 40,000 in this period. Within this group, however, the governing offices were widely distributed, and most of its members would have had in their lifetimes considerable experience of participation in active political life.

The constitution made elaborate provision for the constant circulation of offices, of which over 3,000 fell vacant in any given year. The system of government incorporated three main groups. At its head was an executive consisting of the *Signoria* and its two auxiliary colleges; they initiated legislation which was enacted by a complex of councils and administered by a multitude of special commissions. Membership of most of the more important of these bodies was determined by lot. A scrutiny of guild members occurred at regular intervals, and tickets bearing the names of all those eligible to hold offices were placed in bags from which the appropriate number was drawn when positions fell vacant. Terms of tenure were generally comparatively brief, especially in some of the more powerful magistracies, like the *Signoria*, whose members held office for only two months. The essential intention of this system was to make the elevation of individual citizens to positions of power brief and unpredictable, and thus to minimize the possibility of their using such positions to build up a base for the extension of personal power or the advancement of their private interest.

At the same time the constitution also provided against the expression of such private and particular interests as are represented through parties in a modern parliamentary democracy. Political scientists stress the peculiar position occupied by political parties even in modern democracies, pointing out that they are essentially "private associations to which the law does not give more rights and duties than to other private organizations, but they are usually seen to fulfil an essential representative function without which such governments could not function." In the Florentine system this representative element was almost entirely absent. Citizens were to act *ex officio* and when voting in the councils, solely "according to conscience." Soliciting of votes, or even prior agreement by interested persons on specific issues, was strictly forbidden. Thus parties in the modern sense, as channels for expression and representation of particular interests in government, had no legitimate place in the Florentine system; the only expression of private interest in the totals of "yes" and "no" votes on proposals put before the councils, and the numerous private petitions which testify to the need for such expression, and which opened a doorway to the soliciting of support.

For ultimately these provisions of a "jealous constitution" played an essential role in fostering the very factionalism which they were designed to prevent. A system of government in which such large numbers of private citizens participated could not function in practice without some channels for the representation and expression of the interests of some private individuals and groups, and the lack of continuity in government due to the rapid rotation of key magistracies merely accentuated the weakness of a state still very much in the process of consolidation. As in most societies in which the state is unwilling or unable adequately to defend the interests of the individual, extra-constitutional and unofficial bodies of a sublegal status tended to assume this function. By the beginning of the fifteenth century ele-

ments of the centralized state were gaining ground, and the influence and power of some independent corporate entities, like the *Parte Guelfa* and the guilds, had greatly declined. However, as Gene Brucker has observed, early Renaissance Florence was still very far from being an expression of Burckhardian individualism; in this highly personalized and face-to-face environment a multitude of concrete loyalties competed with the abstraction of the commune in their claims on every citizen. Florentine society was a complex of interest groups from which very few men in the normal pursuit of their personal and civic concerns could stand entirely apart, and indeed most were entwined from birth to death in a network of associations and relationships from which their individual interests and concerns could not easily be disentangled.

At the logical centre of this network was the kin group, extended further by marriage and by relationships with neighbours, business partners, and other natural associates collectively subsumed under the designation *amici*. Friends, relatives, and neighbours constitute the great trinity of Florentine social bonds, which is constantly invoked throughout the period of the republic. Some rare souls, like Ser Lapo Mazzei in the second half of the fourteenth century, might succeed in avoiding such entanglements, but notably even he was moved to comment on the unusualness of his own situation: "There can be no one freer than I; I am bound neither to relatives nor to factions, nor is there anyone with whom I would wish to have such ties." Most would have concurred with Giovanni Rucellai, writing half a century later, when he advised his sons of the great happiness and benefit to be derived "from enjoying the favour and goodwill of kinsmen and relatives and neighbours and all the rest of the men of your district." The value of these associations lay in the support which these groups lent to the individual in all his activities. Giovanni Morelli's *Ricordi* of the early fifteenth century, also designed for the instruction of his heirs, advised them never to take any important step without such assistance, but "with the suitable and sound advice of your good relatives and friends make up your mind about everything that concerns you"; he stressed the folly of those who acted entirely without consulting "anyone else, either relative or friend." These imperatives involved citizens in practice in networks of patronage whose role in Florentine society was fundamental, but whose operation and effect on political life have hitherto been insufficiently acknowledged and explored.

The extent to which they potentially conflicted with the interests of the state and the good of the commune is implicit in recommendations such as that of Gino Capponi to his sons in 1420: "Above all else stick together with your neighbours and kinsmen; assist your friends both within and without the city." The private letters in which individuals often solicited the aid of their *amici* suggest that the range of problems with which they were expected to assist was as broad as the range of the Florentine patrician's interests and concerns, from the contracting of a marriage or the purchase of a house to the carrying-through of a business deal or the obtaining of a tax concession. However, as most upper-class citizens were closely involved with government, a great many letters contain requests for *amici* to circumvent the restrictive constitutional procedures and to arrange unofficially for the appointment of the writer or one of his friends to a particular public office. There was, moreover, a further sense in which most other concerns were ultimately related to politics. Studies

of many aspects of Florentine society have tended to confirm the extent to which the Florentine patrician was a political animal, who regarded political pre-eminence as the crowning reward of economic success and social distinction; at the same time, these attributes could seldom successfully be preserved if they were not protected through political influence. No doubt Lorenzo the Magnificent was not in fact the first to observe that "in Florence a man cannot prosper if he has no share in government."

Where individual concerns were so powerfully affected by the possession of political influence and the exercise of political office, and the public sphere so intimately related to the private, the interest groups based on non-political associations whose members turned traditionally to each other for support might swiftly be transformed into political action groups or parties in times of crisis. The way in which such groups coalesced along the lines of traditional association is nicely illustrated in . . . the Black-White feuds in Florence at the beginning of the fourteenth century. . . . When the barricades went up *amici* [friends], *parenti* [kin], and *vicini* [neighbours] did not inevitably find themselves on the same side; sometimes the intimate pressures of these relationships led in practice to division instead of unity. There are a number of colourful examples in the history of Florence of feuding neighbours, families riven by internal conflict, companies ruined by dissension. However, regardless of the actual directions in which they were driven, Florentines responded to such situations not simply as individuals, but as members of a group or groups bound together by ties of kinship, marriage, neighbourhood, friendship, and custom.

It is clear that the basic principles of political life, and the social conditions which moulded and modified them, had not essentially changed by the beginning of the fifteenth century when the Medici family began its rise to power, except that, as Giovanni Morelli observed in recalling the epic feuds of the Florentine past, "then they used to persecute one another with sword in hand rather than with their votes as they do today." Long before the triumph of the Medici in 1434, once seen as the event which put an end to the actuality of republican government, the realities of power had ceased to correspond to the constitutional prescriptions for its distribution, and indeed the question of where ultimate political influence resided at any given time continues to tantalize students of Florentine politics and society. Certainly according to Cavalcanti, the commune in his time "was governed more from the dinner-table and the study than from the Palace," and he coined the aphorism that "many were elected to offices but few to government." In this sense, then, the story of parties in our period is the story of conflict, not only, or even most profoundly, between opposing factions, but also between unofficial government in the private interest and constitutional government in the public interest; these are the terms in which the problem was perceived in the mid-twenties when a new drive to extirpate factionalism was instituted in the name of the common good.

Both personal and official documents of this period reflect the impression that factionalism, endemic in Florence for reasons which we have discussed, intensified in a wave of unrest from the early twenties onwards. About this time the prominent patrician Buonaccorso Pitti bemoaned in his diary the growth of parties and divisions between the leading citizens, maintaining that on account of these "the welfare and honour of our Commune would be neglected." Bouts of legislation in 1421,

1426, and particularly 1429 suggest that his concern was shared by the ruling group in general; Cavalcanti claimed that Cosimo himself "always sought to put the interest of the Commune above everything else and used to say: Nature teaches us that for the sake of preserving the whole, the part must consider itself of no importance."

The extent to which the issue appeared as a conflict between private and public interest is most clearly seen in the focus of attention on the role of the *Signoria*, the eight Priors led by the Gonfalonier of Justice who constituted the chief magistracy of the state and were virtually its visible embodiment. On appointment to this office, citizens were ideally considered to have shed their private concerns and transcended their personal limitations. Immured in the palace of the Priors for the duration of their two-month term, detached quite literally from their customary environment and interests, they stood for the commune, and were "the principal source of authority and direction for the whole city." In accordance with the view that good government was necessary to the spiritual as well as the secular health of citizens, its maintenance was a sacred trust; notably amidst the multitude of sacred places, objects, and times upon which public religious ritual rested, the only sacred element in the secular sphere was the communal power. In his study of this subject, Richard Trexler has compared the Priors of Florence to "sacred but lay monks whose holiness was in their activity," and who "had acceded to their office . . . through ceremonies resembling rites of passage."

Certainly in their official capacity they were regarded with a reverence akin to piety. Averardo de' Medici bowed to the authority temporarily vested in his partisan enemies as members of the *Signoria*, while taking the opportunity to make a nice distinction between person and office, when he accepted their sentence of exile with the declaration that he never had and never would deny the authority of that "honorable, almost divine magistracy, supreme even to the Lord Priors and rulers of the Republic themselves." The disregard of this deeply held principle in their defiance of the *Signoria* may well have been a significant factor in the downfall of his enemies. Open defiance, however, was not the only, or at all the most characteristic, threat to the supremacy of the *Signoria* as the guardians of government in the interests of the whole, rather than a part of the ruling group. One of the greatest statesmen of his age, Gino di Neri Capponi, put his finger precisely on the problem confronting Florentines in 1420 when he laid down as his first maxim concerning the conduct of the patrician that "the Commune of Florence will preserve its authority in so far as . . . it does not allow any particular citizen or family or group of conspirators within it to become more powerful than the *Signoria*." In a series of meetings of the advisory council to the *Signoria*, convened throughout 1429 and in the early months of 1430 to discuss the means of achieving a unified citizenry, the insistence that no one should seek "to be equal to, or wish to be greater than, the *Signoria*," is a recurring theme. Notably it was on the grounds of their "wishing to violate the ordinances of the Priorate and Gonfalonier of Justice of the Florentine people" that the Medici were condemned.

Early in the course of these discussions an oath was drawn up to be sworn on the Bible by as many citizens from the *reggimento* as possible. They were required to promise simply "to divest themselves completely of all partisan and factional loyalties," and "to consider only the welfare and honour and greatness of the Republic,

and of the *Parte Guelfa*, and of the *Signoria*." Later the tone of discussions in the *Consulte e Pratiche* was to become more intense, and there was a growing emphasis on spiritual sanctions against partisanship and factionalism which divided citizens. In the *Pratica* of 25 January 1429 the opening speaker, Lorenzo Ridolfi, pronounced that: "just as we should adore one God, so you, Lord Priors, are to be venerated above all citizens, and those who look to others are setting up idols, and are to be condemned." Shortly after, Palla Strozzi signified his full agreement with this proposition, and the same theme was later taken up again by Giovanni Morelli who urged the *Signoria* to action with the reminder that "Our Lord stood in the midst of his disciples, and said, peace be unto you! In the same way you, Lord Priors, etc. . . . He who creates a party, sells his liberty . . ."

The extent to which moral aims and ideals, generated in both the secular and the spiritual worlds of the Florentine citizen, were fused in his view of the sacred role of the *Signoria* in suppressing private factions in the interests of the public welfare, finds perfect expression in these passages, which vividly evoke the atmosphere in which the struggle for power between the Medici and their opponents took place. They may help us perhaps to understand why citizens steadfastly continued to defend the letter of the constitution against the expression of separatist interests which had patently undermined it, and to explain the secrecy and stealth with which the manoeuvres of the latter were executed, and which make the task of the historian in identifying and describing these groups and their activities so particularly difficult.

As a consequence of the debates on faction, the office of *Conservatori delle Leggi* was set up early in 1429 with the task of examining evidence of citizens in official positions violating the laws of the commune, and putting private interest above public duty. An anonymous denunciation to this body in October 1429 describes an illegal association purposely created to perform particularly those services and functions generally expected of friends, neighbours, and relatives; indeed members were invited to regard one another in familial terms. They were encouraged to join the group with the inducement that they would henceforth be assured of guidance and protection: "You will be told what you have to do day by day . . . for we must do what our superiors, like fathers, . . . command. You yourself need never worry about anything: in every matter you will have many to defend and honour you." With the observation that "the Commune must maintain its citizens subject to the laws rather than the laws to the citizens," the informant expressed the hope that God would aid the magistracy in its investigations, so that through the formation of such private associations for mutual aid and protection "the Commune should not perish." Nevertheless, an organization such as this represented in fact only a short step further in evolution from the customary associations of friends, neighbours, and relatives whose role and relationships it sought to duplicate in a more formalized way. For as a friend observed, writing to Forese Sacchetti in 1427, "after all, you can do nothing unless, when the need arises, your friends and relatives are willing to exert themselves in your interest—especially in legitimate and honourable matters."

Despite these obvious similarities, the leaders of the *reggimento* in the twenties and thirties generally failed to acknowledge that some conflict between the two guiding principles of Florentine life—concern for the public welfare and loyalty to personal associates—was inevitable. No doubt this was partly because they and their

friends were so involved in government that they tended to regard their share in the state . . . as almost a personal possession or attribute, and it was often difficult for them to distinguish effectively between public and private interest. So they continued, somewhat ingenuously, to declare that "they had never belonged to any faction," nor had any enemies other than those of the *Signoria* had "never taken part in discussions outside the Palace," but nevertheless had favoured "one man more than another according to rank and . . . [family]." However, they soon began to recognize that the best possible hope of eliminating the problem lay in ameliorating those injustices from which parties or groups of *amici* primarily sought to defend their members.

In 1422 and 1426 the main focus of contemporary concern over "parties" were various permanent but unofficial associations which could be used as a cover for the operation of political groups. Chief of these were the religious confraternities, which bore the main brunt of the early phases of the attack on factions. But by 1429, in discussions of the problem in the *Consulte e Pratiche*, there was less emphasis on wiping out potentially subversive associations, and more on the attempt to define the underlying causes and preconditions of the growth of parties. Like Cavaleanti and Buoninsegni, speakers in the council debates stressed the distribution of political offices and taxes as sources of dissension; most fundamentally, the struggle was seen as one between those seeking to increase their status and their share in government, and those at whose expense these gains would be made—the already powerful citizens whose best interests lay in preserving the *status quo*.

... The parties of the Medici and their opponents broadly corresponded in fact to these two sections of the *reggimento*, and . . . they were basically interest groups which, committed to the defence of their members in this as in other respects, became in the process political action groups, or, as the Florentines pejoratively called them, . . . [sects] within the ruling elite. Such parties, then, were not so much specifically political organizations, as in the modern sense, but rather natural outgrowths of permanent and fundamental elements in the structure of Florentine society. Thus the most natural approach to our original problems concerning the origins, nature, and membership of parties is through the identification and exploration of these networks of association and patronage.

This process is much easier in the case of the Medici than for their opponents. Given the nature of parties as we have described them, it is hardly surprising that there are no lists of partisans, and only a handful of leading Mediceans are mentioned by name in the few contemporary comments. Attempts to infer that those particularly prominent in government, or notably favoured by the Medici after 1434, were necessarily their partisans in the preceding years, are partly vitiated by the consideration that after 1434, support of the Medici and support of the state and the government was to a large extent one and indistinguishable, and while the Medici undoubtedly advanced their friends, they did not necessarily discriminate against the solid body of the patriotic supporters of the constitution and its representatives, who ever these might be. However, the Medici family obviously provide a focal point, and the magnificent collection of their letters relating to the years 1426 to 1434 are the primary means of exploring most of the problems which concern us. Unfortunately no comparable evidence survives to illuminate their opponents, but on the

other hand, the list of those exiled by the Medici on their return to Florence in 1434 constitutes a solid if limited definition of the core of that group to serve as a starting-point for our investigation. The personal lives, interests, and associations of both groups are greatly illuminated by the evidence of marriage records, private diaries, letters, genealogical miscellanies, and, above all, tax returns, which are such a mine of information concerning the diverse affairs of every citizen of property after 1427.

Although the sum of our findings from this evidence enables us to confirm and illustrate the connection between these parties and traditional networks of association and interest, the precise relationship of parties to patronage groups remains a problem of some complexity. At the simplest level, it was natural for an individual to seek assistance with his concerns from kinsmen, and, by extension, from those related to him by marriage. Particularly if the power and influence of these most obvious patrons and supporters were limited, he might seek to extend the range of assistance on which he could call by cultivating other relationships with more powerful citizens; thus Morelli, an orphan from a family of comparatively modest status in the city, recommended his sons "to acquire at least one friend or more in your *gonfalone*" and to align themselves in business "with a suitable man, wealthy . . . and especially with political influence, or from a traditionally pre-eminent family." The latter in return would benefit through his honour and status being increased by the enjoyment of a following of citizens dependent on his influence, and with obligations to him which might be satisfied by the requirement of general and specific support and service.

Since most citizens were bound above and below by a veritable mass of such reciprocal obligations of aid and service, to social superiors, equals, and inferiors, in any particular case where assistance was needed the appropriate patron or patrons might be sought from a multitude of associates, related either horizontally or laterally on the social scale; hence it is impossible to say where a patronage network began and ended. It was essentially fluid rather than finite, and the links between men involved in the activation of a chain of patronage could either be of long standing, or forged specifically for the occasion, in which case they might either be subsequently neglected or solidify into permanent relationships.

However, such networks did tend to cluster and coalesce around prominent individuals or great families in a particularly favourable position to dispense patronage, and as Morelli's injunctions imply, citizens regularly sought patronage or service within the general bounds of a particular group, or complex of groups, focused on or led by the greater families. The families of the Medici and their most prominent opponents stood at the centre of such groups, and the evidence relating to the two parties suggests that when clients became partisans, the ties which held the group together were largely the reciprocal obligations of a patronage network. Nevertheless, the precise relationship of patronage network to party within each was rather different, and seems to have been the chief determinant of important differences between the structure and functions of the two parties.

The opposition to the Medici coalesced essentially in response to the threat which the Mediceans offered to the *status quo*; it was based on a fairly selective recruitment from a number of patronage networks only loosely connected with one another, and led by the several prominent families on whom those networks had

chiefly focused. While this process, and the party which it created, is essentially similar to that . . . [of] the early fourteenth century, the Medici letters, the actions of their party, and the nature of its subsequent success all suggest that the growth of the Medici party represented less the natural transformation of interest groups into action groups under the pressure of events, and more the planned and purposeful consolidation of existing social ties, and the creation of new reciprocal obligations, with the express aim of more effective political action. Of course it is impossible to investigate the origin and nature of all the social bonds which cemented the Medici party, and great Florentine families had traditionally cultivated personal followings. The Medici family, however, began the fifteenth century at a peculiar political disadvantage which would, in the natural course of events, have debarred them from acquiring much influence within the ruling group. Thirty years later they exercised an effective ascendancy over it, with the aid of a particularly unified and closely knit group of supporters. In this respect their party differed from those typical of preceding centuries, and of their opponents; it was, apparently, not so much a new style of party, as a necessary modification of the old formula. Based, like its opposition, on a network of patronage which began with kin and extended to incorporate others as necessary and desirable, the Medici party seems to have relied more on friends than family for some essential services because the social and political position of the latter was too weak to provide them. The fact that the Medici party was created mainly by the extension of patronage, and the formation of ties with smaller or newer or politically unpopular families, not solidly entrenched within the ruling group and the social networks which dominated it, made the partisans particularly dependent on their wealthy and socially distinguished patrons, and the latter the undisputed leaders of a network of patronage and association which was particularly dense and centralized.

This would seem to have been an important factor in its success, and indeed the Medici party achieved a success quite unique in Florentine history in promoting the interests of its members; the Medici ascendancy represented almost the complete triumph of unofficial government in the private interest over constitutional government in the public interest. Paradoxically, however, Medici government came near in practice to resolving this eternal conflict simply because its dominance precluded the creation of effective opposition parties, and achieved in time the incorporation of virtually the entire ruling group into its own ranks; for the first time a single party embraced the state and was able to define public interest in terms of its own private needs.

It is the party and its activities before 1434 which constitute the essential subject of this study. My intention is not ultimately to explain or to account entirely for the victory of the Medici over those who opposed their aims, and indeed I am not in a position to do so. There is evidence . . . to suggest that their enormous wealth, the decisive economic influence which it enabled them to exert within the city, the powerful foreign friendships which it brought in its train, made their triumph a diplomatic and financial necessity once their ambitions had been openly declared, and challenged. An adequate consideration of these themes would require a study much broader in scope than the present one, which is basically concerned with the means by which the Medici family translated economic success into political predominance

in the traditional Florentine fashion, in a virtuosio exploitation of the vital weakness of the republican system—the disjunction between the official structure of government and its effective sources of political power in the social structure of its ruling class.

DOCUMENTS

The typical chief magistrate of the communes of early Renaissance Italy was the *podestà*, usually a foreigner serving with broad power for a short term of office. The statutes excerpted here on the duties of the *podestà* of Treviso underscore the need for him to stand above faction to ensure impartiality in government. In the signorial regimes, on the other hand, miniature courts were created whereby the lord oversaw the tasks of war and diplomacy aided by a small staff of advisers and intellectuals. In the second selection, Giovanni Conversini da Ravenna, an early humanist, records vividly the pettiness and humiliations of life at the Carrara court in Padua. However, when republican Venice conquered Padua two decades later, the Venetian government used despotic brutality to extinguish the Carrara dynasty. The Paduan chronicler, G. Gattari describes this process in the third document. Finally, in his famous collective biography the Florentine book-seller and observer, Vespasiano da Bisticci, characterized the mores and interests of the elder Cosimo de' Medici, who ruled Florence "behind the scenes" from 1434 until his death in 1464.

| A Podestà Swears to Do His Duty, 1313

I swear on God's holy gospels that in good faith and without fraud—unmoved by love and hate, [concern for] my own comfort and harm—that to the best of my ability and knowledge, I shall, through myself, my judges and knights, rule the commune of the city of Treviso, its suburbs and its whole district as peacefully and quietly as I can; and I shall preserve and increase in every way the same city, suburbs, district, its laws, jurisdictions, possessions, income, property and revenue, that it now has and will have in the future.

And I shall maintain the well-being of the citizens of Ceneda and especially those of Conegliano, who observe and shall wish to observe pacts and treaties, which they or their forebears made and had made with the commune of Treviso and with the Trevisans, to the laud, honor and glory of God, and to the perpetual peace, tranquility and community that the same city [of Treviso] and its district always desire.

And if there are any wars and discords now or in the future in the city of Treviso, in its suburbs and any part of its district, which God forbid, among any persons subject to the *podestà*'s jurisdiction, that I shall bring them to peace and concord as I

"A Podestà Swears to Do His Duty, 1313," from *Gli Statuti del comune di Treviso* (sec. XIII–XIV), ed. B. Betto (Rome, 1984), Vol. 1, pp. 28–32. Translated by Benjamin G. Kohl.